

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 PM-03 SS-15 NSC-05 DODE-00 SSO-00

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IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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DRAFTED BY OSD/ISA:JMORRISON;RCLARKE

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:TJHIRSCHFELD

EUR/RPM:DJONES

PM/DCA:VBAKER

C:WSHINN

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S E C R E T STATE 159769

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR OPTION III SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE

REF: A. NATO 3520 B. NATO 3560 C. NATO 3595

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THERE FOLLOWS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON TOPICS 2-7, PARA 24,

REF A, WITH EXCEPTION OF TOPIC 4, FOR WHICH GUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

1. QUESTION TWO: STATUS OF TANK ARMY ELEMENTS OTHER THAN TANKS, PARTICULARLY FROGS AND SCUDS.

ANSWER: AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED (STATE 156821, PARA 7 AND STATE 156820, PARA 1A) WE WILL SEEK TO LIMIT SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE TYPE REDUCED BY THE UNITED STATES. WE WILL NOT SEEK TO LIMIT RESIDUAL LEVELS OF THOSE TYPES OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ON WHICH WE ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT CONSTRAINTS OURSELVES.

THERE ARE SUCH SYSTEMS ORGANIC TO A SOVIET TANK ARMY, I.E., FROG AND SCUD SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. SEEKING TO LIMIT THOSE SYSTEMS WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO CONSTRAINTS ON EQUIVALENT WESTERN SYSTEMS SUCH AS LANCE.

WE BELIEVE IT IS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW

ALL ELEMENTS ORGANIC TO A TANK ARMY RATHER THAN SCATTER ITS COMPONENTS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN MAJOR UNITS INCLUDING THEIR ARMAMENTS, BUT WE WILL REQUIRE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION ONLY OF SOVIET MANPOWER AND TANKS. TO DO OTHERWISE COULD PLACE THE AHG IN A POSITION OF NEGOTIATING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND RISK EXPANDING THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO BROADER TRADES OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ON BOTH SIDES.

2. QUESTION THREE: DEFINITION OF TANKS TO BE REDUCED.

ANSWER: SOVIET TANKS TO BE WITHDRAWN SHOULD BE 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SOVIET TANK ARMY TO BE WITHDRAWN. THE SOVIET TANKS SHOULD BE MAIN BATTLE TANKS OF THE MODELS WE HAVE INDICATED FOR LIMITATION (E.G., T-54/55, T-62, T-10 ETC.) SO LONG AS 1,700 TANKS OF THE MODELS MEETING THE MAIN BATTLE TANK DEFINITION ARE REMOVED, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD NOT SEEK TO FURTHER SPECIFY THE REDUCTION, SUCH AS SPECIFYING THE MIX OF MODELS IN THE TANK ARMY OR THAT ALL REDUCTIONS

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HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN TERMS OF ONE SPECIFIC MODEL. TO DO SO WOULD ESTABLISH AN UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT WITH RESPECT TO INHIBITING OR REQUIRING REORGANIZATION OF FORCES. WE WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH CONSTRAINTS ON OUR OWN FORCES. FINALLY WE WOULD NOT WANT TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A RATIONALE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THEIR SPECIFYING WHICH WARHEADS WE WOULD REDUCE.

3. QUESTION FIVE: DEFINITION OF AIRCRAFT TO BE REDUCED.

ANSWER: US AIRCRAFT TO BE REDUCED SHOULD BE DEFINED AS 54 US NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT. SUCH A DEFINITION WOULD PROVIDE THE GREATEST FLEXIBILITY FOR ACTUAL US WITHDRAWALS AND WOULD AVOID UNINTENDED IMPLIED LIMITATIONS, E.G., RESTRICTIONS ON US UNITS. RF-4C'S, WHICH ARE NOT NUCLEAR CAPABLE, WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED AMONG THE 54 AIRCRAFT. SHOULD THE NEED ARISE TO DISCUSS THE DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE, MATERIAL FOR DISCUSSION CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE US PAPER ON AIRCRAFT MODELS (STATE 146646, PARA 5 FF.).

4. QUESTION SIX: INCLUSION OF NUCLEARS IN PHASE ONE ONLY.

ANSWER: THE OFFER OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IS A ONE-TIME OFFER MADE TO ACHIEVE ALLIED PHASE I REDUCTION GOALS, I.E., THE TANK ARMY AND THE COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING THE NON-US NATO REDUCTIONS WE ARE OFFERING IN PHASE II ARE IN THEMSELVES A PRIME EASTERN GOAL. THEREFORE WE DO NOT

BELIEVE THE ALLIES WOULD FEEL IT NECESSARY TO ADD ANY FURTHER "SWEETNER".

5. QUESTION SEVEN: LINKAGE BETWEEN AIR MANPOWER AND OPTION III.

ANSWER: OUR VIEWS ON THE TIMING OF AIR MANPOWER ARE PROVIDED STATE 152110. AS TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR OPTIONAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, WE HAVE STATED (STATE 132089, PARA 51) THAT THE ISSUE OF AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE DEFERRED PENDING THE PRESENTATION OF OPTION III. IF ULTIMATELY WE AGREED TO US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS

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IN PHASE ONE THEY WOULD HAVE TO COMPLY WITH THE THREE CRITERIA WE HAVE SPELLED OUT: 1) BE STRICTLY VOLUNTARY, 2) BE LIMITED TO A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL REDUCTIONS, 3) NOT REQUIRE ANY ADDITIONAL REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF US TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE NSA BEYOND THOSE REDUCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH OPTION III. KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MEETINGS, MILITARY POLICIES, OPTION III
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE159769
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: JMORRISON;RCLARKE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750234-0661
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750776/aaaacqfp.tel
Line Count: 160
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 NATO 3520, 75 NATO 3560, 75 NATO 3595
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04 APR 2003 by Izenbel0>; APPROVED <17 OCT 2003 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR OPTION III SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: NATO BRUSSELS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006